



THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1996

LEADERSHIP, INTEGRITY, AND CORE VALUES

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A member of the
McChord Air Force
Base honor guard.
Photo by Staff Sgt.
Lance S. Cheung.



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STRENGTH THROUGH VIGILANCE

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Writing for TIG Brief



We hope the following guidelines will help you prepare and submit your manuscript for *TIG Brief* magazine.

Our audience

Our primary audience consists of commanders, inspectors general, inspectors, and other Air Force leaders at all levels of command. *TIG Brief* is a management tool specifically designed to reveal deficient areas and to point out potential problems so commanders can be responsive and timely in taking effective preventive or corrective action.

TIG Brief has a secondary audience of supervisors and project managers throughout the Air Force. *TIG Brief* also deals with overall leadership suggestions, important Air Force topics for planning purposes, timely matters covered by laws or regulations, and changing policies and procedures. It encompasses all Air Force functional areas.

Our review process

Before your manuscript goes through our review process, it must go through your

internal coordination process. Once your manuscript has been approved at your level, our review process begins.

The review process generally takes two to three months. The editor, our lawyer, and expert inspectors with experience on the topic of the manuscript review and evaluate it for its interest to *TIG Brief* audience, quality of writing, soundness of content, timeliness, and originality.

Although every manuscript we receive is judged on its own merit, we follow these general criteria:

- ★ Does the manuscript deal with a problem, issue, or condition that is the concern of people in the field?

- ★ Is this a new concern or a new approach to a continuing concern?

- ★ Does the author support the discussion with enough depth to help the reader?

- ★ Does the author support the discussion with examples drawn from actual experience?

- ★ Does the manuscript offer any solutions to the problems discussed?

- ★ Does the manuscript stand as a carefully reasoned presentation?

Preparing your manuscript

The average length of a published article is two pages so

limit the length of your manuscript. We estimate a one-page article to run 400 words. Charts, graphs, and photos are extra.

Please send your manuscript on a 3.5 inch disk with two copies of the double-spaced manuscript. Desktop formatted copies are not acceptable. Charts or graphs should be concise, separated from the body of the text, and detailed enough to make their message clear because they stand alone. Our staff will prepare them to fit the magazine's specifications, so original art is necessary only for unique items (i.e., a drawing). We also need your name, rank, mailing address, E-mail address (if applicable), telephone number, organization, and duty station.

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Making PACAF Quality Air Force Assessments Meaningful and Useful

by General John G. Lorber



“Organizations can’t succeed or survive very long without vision, mission (a sense of purpose), and concern for their members—characteristics of leadership at its finest.”

Have you ever encountered a successful organization in which leadership fails to set the course for the future or ignores important improvement opportunities in critical areas? Have you ever seen a squadron survive that doesn’t know its mission or what tasks need to be done? Have you seen a successful wing that isn’t honest in assessing its own capabilities or where it needs to focus its efforts to be better? How about a staff that’s increasingly effective and efficient in the face of smaller budgets and fewer people and yet forgets to take care of the needs of the officers, airmen, and civilians within the organization? No, I’m confident you haven’t. Organizations can’t succeed or survive very long without vision, mission (a sense of purpose), and concern for their members—characteristics of leadership at its finest.

This leadership must be accompanied by a structured approach to continuously improve our military capability, whether that improvement

is in the form of strategy, tactics, or equipment. We need well-developed, long-range plans that give us direction to focus our energies.

Quality Air Force Assessments (QAFA) are those important vehicles which measure our success and assess our readiness. QAFAs are beginning to show some payoff for the intense time and effort it takes to conduct them. From airmen to general officers in my command, I witness a genuine commitment to inspiring trust, teamwork, and continuous improvement.

Our people truly realize their suggestions for process improvements will be heard and that we all have a stake in the outcome of our combined efforts. Every level of the command is setting goals, developing metrics, and, especially important, they are rewarding superior performance.

However, I sense a growing concern from members of my command that our QAFAs aren’t providing us the data we need to convince us we’re

continually improving our capability to do our jobs. I'm finding that the details of Quality Air Force Criteria are not widely understood; that is, understood beyond unit self assessment (USA) authors and commanders—understood down into the flights and out into the back shops. The criteria are more understood this year than last year but we have a long way to go before understanding and subsequently accepting the criteria.

As we continue to simplify and tailor the Quality Air Force Criteria, PACAF will initiate some improvements to our QAFA format.

Like all our processes, QAFAs are subject to continuous improvement too. We will continue at full speed on our flight path to implement the Quality Air Force approach emphasizing strategic planning and USAs. My Inspector General (IG) will continue to validate the USAs using Quality Air Force Criteria but I have also tasked my IG to increase the level of compliance assessment and evaluate selected processes and programs down to the squadron level.

During my trips around the command, often I hear quality and compliance are incompatible. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, they should reinforce each other. Compliance with proven directives is critical to the way we do business. Much of what we do is inherently dangerous,

so lives are at stake and, in other instances, noncompliance could put us in jail. So we can't allow proven procedures, checklists, "tech" orders, and other areas to be open to "county option" to do our jobs any way that "seems right." It is imperative that we stick with the basics along with our attention to detail. Standardization is an important part of quality assurance. This does not mean that we stop looking for the better way. It does mean that once a better way is found, it becomes the new compliance standard.

We did a bottom-up scrub of our processes and programs to determine which areas should be looked at by the IG to provide more specific performance feedback—that's feedback in addition to our USA validation. Further-more, our people were not finding our QAFA feedback useful and meaningful. The majority still wondered, "How did we do? Are we making progress for all the effort we are expending?" Commanders were not comfortable that mission deficiencies as well as mission successes were being properly identified. We are now going to provide feedback in the form of a grade.

We will still score with the 1,000 point scale because we want to retain the scoring commonality of QAFAs with the other commands but we will also give the wing a position as to where they stand in relation to other wings in

the command. They will know if they are above, below, or right in the middle of the pack. We will provide five-tier ("unsatisfactory" to "outstanding") ratings for selected programs and processes. Our units down to the squadron level will receive a five-tier score. This mission performance score will be a compilation of unit's processes and program scores as well as subjective assessment of their quality progress.

The bottom line is you can't score well unless you're moving out with quality. We still have much refining to do but improved QAFAs that are meaningful and useful to our people are critical to our progress.

In time, we should see a direct relationship between how well a unit does on its QAFA and how well it does on its operational readiness inspection because those same essential characteristics of every successful organization influence the success of both kinds of assessments.

There are many challenges ahead but we have the right people to implement the changes. Our people are talented and motivated and, if we let them, they will build an Air Force that will continue to be the most respected in the world. ➔

Commander, Pacific Air Forces

REENGINEERING QUALITY

Col. Steve E. Trent
HQ PACAF/IG DSN 449-9420

As this issue of *TIG Brief* hits the streets, our Air Force is in the midst of an important effort to reengineer quality. This is not because we haven't had success with our quest for continuous improvement but because we need to implement quality "more better." It has become very apparent that we need to simplify the Quality Air Force Criteria and make it more applicable to our Air Force mission.

Here at Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Inspector General (IG), we have seen steady progress implementing Quality Air Force. Strategic planning, identification of objectives, and goal setting are well-established and ongoing processes. Metrics are improving. Our units are writing better unit self assessments (USA). Our units are learning from each other and Quality Air Force Assessment (QAFA) scores are rising. So what's the beef? Why change the QAFA process?

We found our QAFA feedback was not always meaningful to many of our customers. Assessments based solely on the Quality Air Force Criteria just don't translate well to all of our target audience; i.e., personnel in

the unit being assessed as well as leadership in the unit's chain of command. So who's to blame? Is it the QAFA assessors for not writing our QAFA reports well enough or the customer for not having a greater understanding of Quality Air Force Criteria? Blaming the customer is a bankrupt idea, so we've looked at how we can improve our product.

Those we serve, in the field and in the Numbered Air Force and major command (MAJCOM) headquarters, tell us the Quality Air Force Criteria has too much focus on process and not enough focus on results. They say they want the IG to tell them what the health of the unit is and we don't achieve that result in previous QAFA reports. Again, are they misguided in their understanding of Quality Air Force or is our QAFA feedback the problem? We chose to put the emphasis on improving our QAFA feedback. Therefore, we have reexamined the PACAF QAFA process to correct the shortcomings identified by those we serve.

Here's the PACAF plan for improving QAFAs. First, our senior leadership decided to continue using the Quality Air Force Criteria while fully sup-

porting ongoing efforts to simplify and better adapt Baldrige-based criteria to our mission. However, in addition to the Quality Air Force Criteria, PACAF will add emphasis on specific mission performance standards and compliance items. The objective will be to rate mission performance on the five-tier (“unsatisfactory” to “outstanding”) scale in addition to the scoring of USAs with the Quality Air Force Criteria. Mission performance ratings, down to the squadron level, will be based on performance of specific processes and programs.

To decide what processes and programs to assess, we constructed a large matrix that lists every type of squadron in our command and the processes and programs they possess. We then asked our MAJCOM headquarters directors to help us improve the matrix and to prioritize by indicating which processes/programs the IG should assess on each QAFA and which should be optional or unnecessary to check. Subsequently, we asked the functional experts to construct inspection checklists that will guide our inspectors as they rate the higher priority processes/programs in PACAF units. To be effective, these guides must be a product of the expertise in the headquarters as well as the field and they will require continual refinement by the respective functional staff and field experts. These well-thought-out guides in the hands of our inspectors and augmentees will assure accurate evaluation and specific perfor-

mance feedback.

Throughout development of this improved QAFA process, the guiding intent has been to continue encouraging progress in our quality efforts while providing more meaningful assessment feedback on specific processes and programs that are indicators of the “health” of a unit; that is, their capability to perform their assigned missions. As we worked toward this objective, we discovered that since the demise of the unit effectiveness inspection, several functional areas had initiated inspection-type visits to verify that units were maintaining acceptable levels of mission performance standards. Some of these visits will need to continue but many of them will no longer be necessary because they can be consolidated into our improved QAFA. This consolidation has the potential to reduce the inspected unit’s workload of preparing for multiple inspections while possibly saving TDY costs.

Another aspect of past QAFAs we found displeasing to some of our customers was the rating system. Although quality experts don’t endorse performance ratings for individual personnel or internal subunits of an organization, our customers in the field tell us they want to know “how they did” in relation to other units in the command. Often we find the 1,000-point scale is not clearly understood. To correct this deficiency in our validation of USAs, we have begun publishing a bar chart presentation of scores for each category and item of the Quality

Air Force Criteria as well as the overall score. This bar chart depicts the command’s lowest, highest, and average scores in relation to the unit’s score. It makes relative performance readily apparent while clearly communicating successes and pinpointing areas needing improvement.

In addition to supplementing the Quality Air Force 1,000-point rating of USAs with the relative comparison bar charts, we will rate mission performance in our squadrons, groups, and wings on the five-tier scale. These five-tier ratings will be based on a combination of how units are performing processes and conducting programs according to the functionally developed mission performance guides and the strength of their continuous improvement efforts. “Excellent” and “outstanding” ratings will only go to those units that do well with mission performance standards **and** are able to demonstrate strong progress integrating Quality Air Force tenets into their daily operations as well as in their long-range planning.

We’ve worked hard on these QAFA improvements but we certainly don’t expect them to be the last. Additional refinements and improvements must continue as we strive for more useful and meaningful feedback. It’s effort well spent because QAFAs are critical tools for improving our mission performance—and improving our performance is what it’s all about.➔

SIX CARDINAL RULES OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ERA OF CORE VALUES

Lt. Col. Mike Schmitt

Naval War College DSN 948-3373

Accountability is an issue that my community, the world of “JAGdom,” has been thinking about a lot lately. It’s part and parcel of the topic of the day—core values. You hear about them at conferences, the quality folks have produced nifty core value posters, and no strategic plan is complete without paying homage at the temple of core values.

So what’s all the talk really about? Is it eyewash? Is it form over substance? Are core values the newest fad? Has political correctness overcome the Air Force? Everyone knows that real warfighters certainly can’t be serious about carrying around one of those silly laminated cards with the wing’s core values printed on them—or can they?

Well, I think they can and I think they should. I think we need to get this core value stuff right before we do anything else. Unfortunately, I’m not sure we’ve done that. So I like the obsession with core values. From my humble perspective, one of the best tools we’ve got to drive the process of internalizing core values is accountability; that is, holding others accountable for what they do or don’t do and accepting accountability for our own

action or inaction. You see, all this core value chanting is pretty neat and I sure feel good when I finish doing it but, somehow, we’ve got to get the principles from the card into our brains and hearts. Accountability is the way we train ourselves and others in the discipline of core values and the way we identify those who just

don’t get it.

Sound like just another pitch from another barrister in blue with a punishment fetish? Maybe. Punishment happens to be one way we respond to those who violate our core values. It’s designed to deter evil miscreants from further wrongdoing and to convince others that similar deviant behavior isn’t the best of ideas. I think accountability is much more complex than that. I’d like to offer you Six Cardinal Rules of Accountability. I won’t pretend that these six are **the** rules or the **only** rules. They are not. Instead, they are simply those points I find myself making over and over again as I

offer advice to commanders, first shirts, and supervisors. Hopefully, they will cause you to do your own thinking about accountability and the role it can play in today’s Air Force.

Rule 1: Accountability Starts at Home

If you are going to hold others accountable for their actions, then you need to be willing to accept accountability for your own. Otherwise, you create a double standard that will not only **not** help others internalize core values but actually mock those values by conveying the

message that the road to success is paved with hypocrisy and selfishness. That will teach our folks that the whole, the team, is less important than its parts, particularly if that part happens to be well placed.

Failure to accept accountability comes in many forms. It’s present when your metrics package is designed to make you and your operation look good rather than to identify processes needing tweaking. It’s there when you blame failures on your subordinates or other organizations, when you tell the boss what he wants to hear (rather than what he should hear), or when you hide things from “the old man.” It’s

the reason some people always seem to have an excuse (they call it a justification or explanation) for things that don't go right. It's even present when you recommend yourself for an award you don't deserve or when your OPR input make it seem you can walk on water though you can't even swim. I think it's this simple—those who can't accept accountability don't deserve to lead. They may be darned good technicians but sooner or later they and their operations will collapse. Why? Because the team, whether a wing, squadron, shop, or section looks to the “leader” to set the standards. If leaders don't hold themselves accountable, they can't possibly be committed to core values. An organization devoid of values is one primed for failure.

Rule 2: Know to Whom and What to be Loyal

An expressed or implied component of virtually all sets of core values is loyalty—but loyalty to whom? Is it loyalty to one's subordinates or supervisors? To perceive loyalty in such terms is to invite confusion whenever those individuals don't measure up. I think we need to think in terms of loyalty to our core values. If we do, then all other forms of loyalty will naturally result. Let me explain.

Loyalty to a subordinate means supporting her when she should be supported and not shying away because that support may not be politically correct or may place you in a tough posi-

tion. It also means not supporting her, even pulling the trigger on her, when that is what she deserves. I can't count the number of times I've seen superiors go to

then, by violating them, the individual has been disloyal to you. Nothing is more disloyal because, hopefully, you define yourself by those values. Further,

“I won't pretend that these six are the rules or the *only* rules. They are not. Instead, they are simply those points I find myself making over and over again as I offer advice to commanders, first shirts, and supervisors.”

bat for subordinates just because they did a good job or were “good guys.” Such facts are certainly valuable information to have when deciding how to react to a violation of a core value but they sure aren't the whole story. Accountability is about doing the right thing based on the good and the bad. It's about doing what's right rather than what will make you popular. It's about a willingness to make tough decisions because you are committed to enforcing core values. It's about being a champion of core values and of those individuals who display a commitment to them.

One of the most common things I hear is that you have to be loyal to the individual because he or she has been loyal to you by supporting your decisions and working hard in pursuit of your goals. This seems to suggest that loyalty of this sort merits a lower threshold of accountability. Let's begin with a basic truth. If you are committed to core values


to trivialize or overlook core values because the troop in question worked hard to realize your agenda is to render core values subservient to that agenda. You must also understand that you lead a team composed of more than one person. What message do you send when those closest to you, your right hand people, are least accountable? You will create an organization of sycophants. I would argue that the greater the fall from grace, the greater the violation of core values. This heightens, not diminishes, the importance of accountability. Therefore, when officers and senior NCOs, particularly those close to the throne, aren't held accountable for violations of core values, the result is disaster, not loyalty.

Rule 3: Accountability Means Knowing Who to Blame

Most of us are pretty nice

guys and, because of that, we don't like holding people accountable. We just don't like being "mean" and in some hard-to-define way, it leaves us feeling guilty ourselves. The result? We sometimes fail to fully hold people accountable because "it may affect her chances for promotion," "he will be forced out with high-year tenure," "an unfavorable information file (UIF) will make it hard for her to get a good follow-on assignment," or "it will embarrass him and his family." Indeed, I've even seen juries display this phenomenon, sometimes leaving the deliberation room feeling as if they were the guilty party.

The truth of the matter is that whatever the fall out, you aren't responsible for it at all. The wrongdoer is responsible and he accepted that responsibility the moment he decided to deviate from the values we expect of him. He chose to climb in a car and drive drunk, not you. He decided that writing rubber checks was the path to material bliss, not you. He decided to sexually harass the airman, not you. You were not part of the decision process and you are not responsible for the natural consequences of that process. Your job is to hold the individual accountable for what he or she decides. So long as your response is equitable, the "right price to pay" if you will, you shouldn't allow yourself to be fooled into believing that somehow you bear responsibility for



the results of someone else's breach of standards. It's okay to feel sorry for them but, if core values are to survive, you must make them accountable for their own actions.

Rule 4: Confession is Good for the Soul

I'm a firm believer in the old adage that confession is good for the soul. When people are responsible for something that goes amiss, they should own up to it. While I realize that there is a constitutional right to silence, it basically only applies in formal criminal proceedings such as Article 15s or courts-martial. Other than that, you should expect your people to "belly up to the bar" and accept accountability. If a person can't, the chance that they will ever internalize core values is slim.

Worse than refusing to accept responsibility is lying. This applies even in criminal matters, for there is absolutely no right to lie. You can keep your mouth shut but, if you open it and lie, you should expect to pay a severe price. When you catch your people lying; lower the boom; lying is a core violation of core values. Further, you must always hold liars accountable for the underlying action and the ensuing lie. In noncriminal cases involving a failure to acknowledge

responsibility, the same rule applies—hold them accountable for their silence as well as the underlying conduct.

Rule 5: Be Consistent

Accountability must exhibit neutral valence. It must be internally and externally consistent. This doesn't mean that you should blindly apply set formulae to every breach of values. Consider all the relevant circumstances; every case is different. However, before you deviate from the "norm" in responding to breaches, you should be able to articulate a distinction in your case that results in your deviation fostering core values more effectively than the "school response."


Even more basic than response is accountability itself. What you must understand is that if accountability is to have its intended purpose, you must hold everyone accountable for their actions, i.e., you must be externally consistent. No exceptions. Consistency is recognizing that while different responses to violations of our core values can be justified, holding some accountable while others "get a walk" cannot. The minute you deviate from this principle, you've lost the war because your folks will not be able to do cause-effect analysis. They will not draw the conclusion that breaches in and of themselves have a cost. More importantly, you will be

seen as, at best, paying lip service to the values you are charged with living by.

At the same time, accountability must be internally consistent, i.e., those actions you take to enforce accountability in a specific instance must fit nicely into the overall scenario. In other words, advancing core values requires the absence of contradiction. For example, how do you square leaving a commander in command if he has just received an Article 15? You can't. How do you justify allowing someone who has sexually harassed a subordinate to remain her supervisor? You can't. How do you explain leaving someone in a position of authority when they abused that very authority? It can't be done. If your actions are not internally consistent, you might as well climb to the nearest mountain top and shout your devotions to the principle of form over substance. You'll lose your credibility—and you should.

Rule 6: Accountability is Forever

Forgiveness is a virtue but accountability is forever. You see, a breach of core values is a data point that should not be easily forgotten. Unfortunately, superiors all too often do forget or seem to. This phenomenon occurs in myriad ways: the airman with a reprimand who gets nominated for airman of the quarter two months after the reprimand; the



UIF that is closed early to permit reenlistment; the officer with an Article 15 who gets promoted six months later; an individual with a disciplinary record who gets put in for an end-of-tour decoration; or an officer or senior NCO with a breach of core values in his or her not too distant past who is permitted to pass judgment on others, whether it be through EPRs, OPRs, decorations, awards, or unit recognition.

True, we need to place things in proper context, we need to be measured and we need to have compassion. People are rehabilitated at times. However, it is up to them to demonstrate that rehabilitation has occurred and, the greater the breach of core values, the greater their burden of proof. The danger in putting the breach aside too early or too easily is twofold. First, you send the message that breaches of core values are easily survived, maybe even that they simply don't matter. It was all for show. If you want your people to give mere lip service to core values, reward those who violate them. Indeed, if you really want to make a mockery of values, allow violators to sit in judgment on individuals who have never breached them.

The second danger is even more basic. The Air Force is a meritocracy, i.e., an entity "ruled" by those who have displayed the greatest degree of merit. Since

the values in question are core, they should be the most heavily weighted factors in

determining who has merit. You subvert our meritocracy when you start gaming the system to benefit core value violators. When you decorate an individual who has violated our values, it renders meaningless the decorations earned by those who haven't violated any values. When you state that an officer has "met standards" when she hasn't, you are either lowering the standard to one which accepts breaches of core values or erasing it altogether. If we don't hold individuals accountable for their actions, then there isn't any tangible incentive to internalize values. It's also just unfair to treat those who have and those who haven't breached values the same—because they aren't.

Concluding Thoughts

I don't know that I've ever seen an era in which the Air Force has been in greater flux. If you think about it though, I mean really think hard, most of the change is for the better. I would certainly number the emphasis on core values among the positively shifted paradigms. But if we are going to treat core values as more than something to mouth in the right audience, we must search for ways to internalize those values. I urge you to consider accountability as one effective way to do so.➔

Tracking Recent Inspections

The following are the most recent Air Force Inspector General's Functional Management Review (**FMR**) and Acquisition Management Review (**AMR**) reports. The information in this section is general in nature and contains only the purpose and scope of the reviews. We do not include specific findings and/or recommendations because they are privileged information.

However, Air Force organizations may request a copy of these reports by calling Tech. Sgt. Widener at **DSN 246-1645** or writing him at HQ AFIA/CVS; 9700 G Avenue SE, Suite 345D; Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5670. Requests can also be made via E-mail using this Internet address: **tig@smtps.saia.af.mil**. Agencies outside the Air Force desiring a copy of any of these reports should contact SAF/IGI by dialing DSN 227-5119 or commercial (703) 697-5119.

AMR of Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA), PN 95-502, assessed the COEA development process and its usefulness to decision makers. Major areas reviewed were policy and guidance, organizational responsibilities, resources, operational analysis, life cycle cost analysis, test and evaluation, and usefulness to decision makers. (*HQ AFIA/AIS, Lt. Col. David B. Wile, DSN 246-1732*)

★ ★ ★

AMR of Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E), PN 95-503, reviewed the management structure responsible for management of and accountability for DT&E, which includes contractor- and government-conducted development testing. The team reviewed applicable regulations, instructions, and policy; conducted interviews; documented findings; and provided recommendations. Major areas reviewed were DT&E requirements determination, oversight, accountability, and reporting. (*HQ AFIA/AIS, Lt. Col. James J. Schiermeyer, DSN 246-1726*)

★ ★ ★

FMR of Bare Base Freight Operations, PN 94-626, assessed progress towards improvement of bare base freight movement capability. The team reviewed Air Force and major command (MAJCOM) policy and guidance on bare base freight operations to determine adequacy and suitability. The team also conducted interviews with traffic management and air transportation specialists to determine training received for operations in a bare base environment. The team determined if MAJCOMs provided opportunities for field units to plan and practice bare base operating procedures. (*HQ AFIA/MIL, Maj. Wayne R. Byron, DSN 246-2009*)

FMR of Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO) Team Training, PN 95-608, evaluated the efficiency and effectiveness of base-level PERSCO training in support of contingency operations. The team reviewed Air Force policy and guidance regarding PERSCO training for deployment and employment; assessed PERSCO training capability in support of war plan taskings; examined military personnel flight (MPF) operations in support of PERSCO/personnel; and interviewed MPF chiefs, PERSCO team members, and other readiness personnel. (*HQ AFIA/MIS, Lt. Col. Gerald G. Kaiser, DSN 246-2192*)

To better serve our customers, personnel FMRs can now be accessed by MAJCOMs, MPFs, and any other agency having access to timesharing (TSS) through the ZEUS function. The latest personnel FMR, PN 95-608, can be reviewed in timesharing SYS2 under the file 02MIS01/PERSCO. If you have any questions on retrieving the reports, please contact Lt. Col. Rudy I. Kamman at DSN 246-2256.

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FMR of Flightline Closed Circuit Television, PN 95-609, ascertained the performance and capabilities of flightline closed circuit television monitoring systems (CCTVS) in use by several major commands. The team examined base-level policies and control of CCTVS during daily operations and emergencies; compared performance, capabilities, and associated maintenance programs among units; and examined effectiveness of flightline security enhancement through the combination of CCTVS with redesigned patrol coverage, the flightline constable program, and other initiatives. (*HQ AFIA/MIS, Lt. Col. Gary E. Reed, DSN 246-2259*)

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FMR of Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Workers' Compensation Program, PN 95-615, evaluated the effectiveness of management and administration of the NAF workers' compensation program. The team reviewed Air Force NAF workers' compensation policy and guidance, reviewed safety programs, and evaluated base-level application of worker compensation guidance and safety training. (*HQ AFIA/MIS, Capt. Teddy D. Oelfke, DSN 246-2638*)

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FMR of Air Force Weapons Safety Programs, PN 95-616, determined the effectiveness of management programs, guidance, and training used to establish and implement unit-level weapons safety programs. Although weapons safety is comprised of three disciplines: explosives, missile, and nuclear safety, the scope of the FMR focused specifically on explosives safety and nuclear safety for those applicable units and commands visited. (*HQ AFIA/MIL, Chief Master Sgt. Parke E. Davis, DSN 246-2185*)→



LEADERSHIP AND THE QUALITY AIR FORCE

Lt. Col. Kenneth N. Mandley
HQ AFIA/FIC DSN 246-1846

There are those in the Air Force who criticize Quality Air Force (QAF) initiatives on the basis of its emphasis on teams, process control, and knowledge of customer requirements. They believe this emphasis somehow detracts from the Air Force's traditional emphasis on leadership. They are absolutely, 100 percent, dead wrong.

Quality Air Force means different things to different individuals. However, the best description of what constitutes Quality Air Force is found in Air Force Instruction 90-501, *Criteria for Air Force Assessments*. These criteria, based on the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award criteria, consist of seven categories further divided into items and areas.

The first of the seven categories is *Leadership*. The first item in this category asks leaders to evaluate themselves on their personal visible commitment within the organization. Leaders must evaluate themselves on how well they know the strengths and weak-

nesses of their unit through setting objectives and reviewing the progress toward those objectives, how they go about creating and communicating the values of the unit, and how they go about bringing subordinate leaders along with them. Finishing the lineup, the criteria ask how the senior leaders of the unit evaluate and improve their own leadership capabilities. These are not "touchy-feely" sorts of things but a hard-nosed approach to how leaders accomplish the difficult task of leading.

In the second item within the category, the criteria ask how the senior leaders use their values and focus to set specific requirements for subordinate leaders, down to the lowest levels of the organization. They then ask how leaders ensure that all unit personnel know about, and buy into, the leaders' focus and values. They mandate hard-nosed, fact-based review of performance by all organizational levels and then ask how leaders assist units that are not performing to expectation.

"...implicit in each of the categories is the idea that leaders drive the effort of the whole organization."

Finally, they ask how all managers and supervisors are evaluated and how improvements are made.

The third and final item in the leadership category asks difficult questions that center around integrity and responsibility. The category is named *Public Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship*, but the words in the area coverage sound like a discourse on ethical behavior. Words such as “a summary of the principal public responsibility areas,” “how the organization leads as a corporate citizen,” and “how the organization promotes legal and ethical conduct in all that it does” appear prominently throughout the item.

The remaining six QAF criteria categories do not directly speak to the role of leaders in the organization. However, implicit in each of the categories is the idea that leaders drive the effort of the whole organization. Category 2, *Information and Analysis*, focuses on the collection, management, and use of data to drive excellence and improve performance. This does not happen by accident. Fact-based decisions occur only when leaders are committed to this kind of approach and are willing to do the hard work necessary to collect useful data.

Category 3, *Strategic Quality Planning*, examines the way in which the organization plans for the future and prepares to carry out those plans. The focus is not on planning a quality program but on the quality of the planning process and the adequacy of the plans themselves. This is clearly the responsibility of leaders. Leaders must set the agenda for the organization, review progress in meeting goals and objectives, and provide mid-course corrections as needed.

Category 4, *Human Resource Development and Management*, supports the notion that one of the most important tasks of any leader is to take care of their people. The category covers the “people plans” of the organization; the ways in which people are encouraged to become more and more involved in the organization; and ways in which the organization provides for education, training, and development. Category 4 goes on to ask how excellent performance is recognized and in what ways the unit encourages good morale and esprit de corps. All of these activities are leader dependent and leader driven.

Category 5, *Management of Process Quality*, covers the way in which an organization ensures its products and

services are of the highest quality and that it is operating in the most effective and efficient manner possible. The words in the criteria may be somewhat foreign to our military ears but the activities have always been very familiar to Air Force leaders.

Categories 6, *Product and Service Quality Results*, and 7, *Customer Focus and Satisfaction*, focus on the results of the previous activities. In addition, Category 7 also focuses on how the organization interacts with its customers and ensures they are satisfied. Although the term “customer” wasn’t used until recent years to describe the person gaining benefit from a unit’s mission, the fact is that all military organizations have someone who uses what the unit produces. Whether it is a supported theater commander or a person receiving an assignment, all units have customers. If leaders focus on performing the mission so that the customers’ needs are met, it is likely that unit personnel will focus on that too.

Far from pushing leaders into the unimportant background, Quality Air Force efforts put great emphasis on the critical roles that leaders play in successful mission accomplishment.➔

Fraud in the Air Force

Maj. James G. Pasierb
AFOSI/PA DSN 297-4728

The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) investigates all types of fraud cases against the government. Fraud costs the Air Force millions of dollars annually. Most AFOSI fraud investigations are in the procurement area: product substitution/diversion/mischarging, conflicts of interest, and bribery. Other types of fraud involve military and civilian members who have been caught cheating the Air Force. In these budget-tightening days, the impact of fraud, waste, and abuse is felt throughout the Air Force, and we should all accept the responsibility to prevent it at every opportunity. Mutual command and AFOSI support coupled with teamwork are essential for successful prevention, detection, and neutralization of fraud. Here are some examples.➔

Travel Voucher Fraud and Misuse of a U.S. Government Credit Card

Subject: USAF Colonel

Synopsis: An AFOSI investiga-

tion disclosed that irregularities occurred during a TDY taken by the individual to an east coast resort city. Further investigation revealed that numerous personal charges were made on a U.S. Government American Express card to include purchases at casinos, night clubs, rental car agencies, hotels, and restaurants as well as ATM cash advances not related to official travel.

Results: The individual received a fine of \$250, an Article 15, a written reprimand, and forfeited \$400.

Inaccurate Pricing of Air Force Equipment

Subject: Top 100 Air Force Contractor

Synopsis: Almost three years ago, an AFOSI investigation began amidst allegations that an aircraft manufacturer falsely certified it provided current, accurate, and complete cost pricing data on the B1-B aircraft. After an exhaustive probe by the AFOSI, the company entered into a settlement with the U.S. government.

Results: The company agreed to pay the govern-

ment more than \$23.5 million and withdraw claims in the amount of more than \$173.5 million. As a result of the large monetary settlement, criminal charges against the company were dropped.

Accepting Gratuities from a Government Contractor

Subject: U.S. Air Force Civilian, GS-13

Synopsis: Acting upon allegations from five of the subject contractor's employees, a long-term AFOSI investigation revealed a civilian program manager at a large mid-western Air Force base accepted gifts and gratuities that consisted of food, drink, and other items. These gratuities included three vacations for the GS-13 and his family in which meals, lodging, and golf packages were included.

Results: The civilian worker received two years probation, a \$500 fine, and a \$50 special assessment. Additionally, he was ordered to perform 100 hours of community service and was terminated from government service.➔



Summary of Recent Audits

Ms. Terri Buckholtz
AFAA/DOO DSN 426-8012

The Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) provides professional and independent internal audit service to all levels of Air Force management. The reports summarized here discuss ways to improve the economy, effectiveness, and efficiency of installation-level operations and, therefore, may be useful to you. Air Force officials may request copies of these reports by contacting Ms. Terri Buckholtz at the number above or writing her at HQ AFAA/DOO, 1125 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1125.

Management of Flight Planning Resources at an Air Combat Command installation needed improvement. Specifically, map requirements were not always valid and on-hand inventories were not properly controlled. Further, on-hand flight information publications were excess to established requirements. Although the Air Force receives flight planning resources free of charge from Defense Mapping

Agency (DMA), adjusting the requirement levels would produce an estimated annual savings to the DMA of \$305,000. (*Report of Audit 20795019*)

Crash Recovery Management at an Air National Guard base required improvement. While equipment was inspected in accordance with applicable technical orders and crash recovery lift/training exercises were conducted annually as required, not all members were qualified in required courses. Specifically, training was not scheduled when all team members were present. Consequently, not all crash recovery team members received minimum qualification (hands-on) training designed to qualify personnel for specific duty positions. (*Report of Audit 92595082*)

Controls Over the Use of International Merchant Purchase Authorization Card (IMPAC) at an Air Combat Command base needed improvement. Specifically, a purchase was split

into multiple purchases to avoid the dollar limitation for a single purchase, card-holders allowed other personnel to use their cards, and purchases were made prior to funds availability. In addition, supporting documentation for purchases was not properly maintained and monthly IMPAC statements of account were not always certified. (*Report of Audit 91695030*)

Procedures for Official Travel Arrangements at two Air Force Materiel Command centers needed improvement. Official air travel was not always obtained from the city airport providing the most economic cost to the government. Specifically, the lowest cost departure and arrival points were not always used. In addition, justification was not always provided to use the more expensive flight arrangements or to use non-contract carriers. Annual savings at one of the centers was estimated at \$465,000. (*Reports of Audit 40395063 and 40395064*)→



The Family Advocacy Committee

The Bottom Line for a Successful Installation Family Advocacy Program

The purpose of the Air Force Family Advocacy Program (FAP) is to promote family well being and reduce the impact of family maltreatment and exceptional family needs on the duty performance of Air Force active duty members. How the FAP becomes a reality is the responsibility of the installation commander; the Director, Base Medical Services (DBMS); the Family Advocacy Committee (FAC); and the Family Advocacy Officer (FAO) and staff, all of whom have defined roles and responsibilities.

Table 1, "A Systems Perspective of the Base-Level Family Advocacy Program," demonstrates the complexity of creating an effective installation FAP. While decisive responsibility resides with the installation commander, the success or failure of the FAP depends on the active involvement and coordination among a host of players, both on base and in the civilian community. Certainly, the successful operation of the FAP involves many more players than the assigned Family Advocacy



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Officer and their staff. The installation FAC is the forum in which all of the players meet to develop a proactive and integrated FAP.

During Health Services Inspections (HSI), a frequently observed concern is the degree to which the FAC members work together to implement an effective installation FAP. As a corollary, one important aspect of this process is the degree to which FAC meeting minutes adequately report (for historical continuity) the development of important decisions, policy recommendations, and program implementation. It is important to establish and maintain clear channels of communication among FAC members. Installation FAPs have difficulty meeting the intent of USAF regulatory guidance when any of the following occur:

1. One or more of the key players relinquish their responsi-

bility and delegate to a person who does not have the knowledge, expertise, or authority to carry out their function.


2. Communication channels break down among major functional areas of the system (indicated by the highlighted boxes in Table 1).

3. The FAO does not recognize the importance of maintaining a system's perspective and attempts to do everything by him/herself (if this occurs, FAC members, with their busy schedules, may well allow their roles to be carried out by someone else, regulations notwithstanding).

4. When key players PCS, an effective process is not in place to ensure new players receive sufficient briefing/training to effectively take over and fulfill their functions.

Establishing an effective installation FAP may seem monumental but that is not the case. The AFD 40-3, *The Family Advocacy Program*; AFI 40-301, *Family Advocacy*; and *The USAF Family Advocacy Program Standards* published by the Air Force Medical Operations

Table 1: A Systems Perspective of the Base-Level Family Advocacy Program



Agency provide clear written guidance and serve as model protocols for addressing all requirements needed to implement an effective FAP. *The Dragon Slayer's Guide: An Unofficial Guide for New Air Force Family Advocacy Officers and Social Work Officers* also addresses a wealth of organizational history and problem solving. The central theme that runs through these publications is the importance of the FAC in the successful implementation of a local FAP. Additionally, major command FAP managers provide crucial staff assistance when questions develop or problems occur.

The FAC is the base-level forum where issues are clarified; local policies are developed; and installation-specific programs are designed, directed, and implemented. It goes without saying

that any USAF installation is a busy community. Most personnel already have many meetings to attend. In terms of the quality of life, the FAC is one of the most important venues for addressing variables which impact family functioning, the sponsor's well being, and, ultimately, mission capability.

As HSI teams travel around the Air Force, what differentiates a "satisfactory" FAP from an "unsatisfactory" or "marginal" program is the presence of a viable FAC with strong, senior-base leadership. When the FAO attempts to implement a wing-wide program in a vacuum, it simply does not work. On the other hand, what differentiates a "satisfactory" FAP from an "excellent" or "outstanding" program is the degree to which "systems" perspective and interrelationships are understood

by all players. Absolutely essential for this to occur is the involvement of installation senior leadership in the FAC to articulate the vision and goals of the local FAP based on the installation's mission.

In summary, the bottom line of an effective FAP is a dynamic FAC functioning under the active leadership of the wing commander and DBMS who articulate the vision and goals and provide direction and guidance. In turn, the FAC empowers and supports the FAO and his/her staff in the creative development of programs to meet community needs. The FAC meeting minutes serve to record important policy decisions and guidance and provide a sense of historical continuity. In other words, the FAC meeting minutes capture the dynamic aspects of the FAP system. ➔

M EASURE

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S ATISFACTION